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LEVINAS, QUAKERS AND THE (IN)
VISIBILITY OF GOD: RESPONSES TO
JEFFREY DUDIAK AND COREY BEALS
Rachel Muers

I

was sorry at the time not to be able to attend the discussion of the
papers by Corey Beals and Jeffrey Dudiak and am even more so,
having read the papers themselves. I have long agreed with Dudiak,
and others, that Levinas’ account of responding to the face of the
other has resonances with the Quaker summons to “[answer] that of
God in everyone”. Dudiak points us towards an account of God that
begins with, and never departs from, the face-to-face encounter with
the other, for whom I am always-already responsible. As Dudiak so
clearly explains, for Levinas “knowledge” of God begins in bearing
witness to, responding to, the “traces” of God’s glory in the world—
primarily, in the summons to ethical responsibility. In other words,
God is answered, responded to, when we answer our fellow human
beings in their need.
Dudiak convincingly demonstrates that this does not domesticate
God. Indeed, as Corey Beals also notes, it can be seen as Levinas’ way
of remaining faithful to the biblical injunctions against making images
of God. God Godself never becomes graspable; what is perceived in
the face of neighbor is, not directly God, but the “glory” of God,
or the command of God. There is no risk here of reducing God to
a property or characteristic of persons. For myself, I would argue
that Levinas might point us back to the original context and import
of the well-loved expression, “that of God in everyone,” which was
not an indicative statement about where God is to be found, but
a proposal about how God is to be responded to, and witnessed to,
through action that transforms social relationships.
For this reason, I would want to be a little more cautious than is
Beals about seeing Levinas’ work as describing a way of seeing God
in the face of the other—of seeing “that of God in everyone”—and
even more cautious about making the further move to “God […]
directly present in all things” (my italics). On my reading of Levinas,
he would be reluctant to use the language of visibility and presence
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here, precisely because of the risk of conceptual idolatry, to which
Beals alludes. For Levinas, working within Jewish tradition, glory does
not need to be about visibility or knowability; glory is kabod, weight,
the “impact” of God in the world, which is encountered as much or
more when we follow or obey God as when we contemplate God.
(Thus, note a common interpretation of Exodus 33:17-23, when
Moses asks to see God’s glory and is shown the “back” of God—the
part that is seen by the one who follows.) The glory of God does imply
“relations”—see the quotation from Levinas with which Beals begins
his discussion—but these relations are not necessarily appropriately
described in terms of vision. I suspect that when Levinas writes of “a
‘seeing’ that does not know what it sees,” his extreme caution around
the language of seeing is intended precisely to dissuade any move
towards specifying the nature of God’s visibility.
Interestingly, I suspect that Levinas (or at least some of his Jewish
interpreters) might have a way to make sense of Beals’ reflections on
the presence of God “in all things,” in the idea that the command
of God, and the invitation to respond to it, accompanies people in
everything they do. In other words, while Levinas’ primary focus is
undoubtedly on the “face” of the human neighbor, the wider religious
context on which he draws might suggest a wider—perhaps an
indefinitely wide—range of contexts for witnessing to God’s “glory,”
as any ordinary activity or event may carry with it the injunction to
1
fulfil a mitzvah. Perhaps this, in turn, might resonate with aspects of
Quaker thought—for example, with the insight that one’s “walk,”
one’s manner of everyday life, is both a witness to the reality of God
2
and a means of deepening one’s relationship with that reality. That
would not, however, be the same as saying that we could see or know
the presence of God in everything.
Gregory Palamas’ theological and spiritual framework is, of
course, radically different. Palamas speaks from the experience of
the contemplative life, and out of an Orthodox tradition for which
deification, the transformation of humanity into the very likeness of
God, is a central concern. I would agree with Beals that we can—and
indeed may need to—learn something from Palamas in order to make
fuller sense of Quaker tradition. We probably cannot settle, as Levinas
might, for an account of God’s “glory” in human life that remains
focused on the encounter with the neighbor. We need to speak of how
we are ourselves transformed by God’s indwelling in us, enlightened
by the inward Light. Palamas’ work may indeed offer rich resources
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here—see for example the suggestive quotation used by Beals about
how the “spiritual light” is “not only the object of vision, but also the
power by which we see”. I would merely wish to express caution about
the extent to which, or the ease with which, we can make Levinas and
Palamas talk the same language or inhabit the same conceptual world.
This caution of mine could, admittedly, cause some problems if
we want to say that both Levinas and Palamas are expressing insights
that are crucial to Quaker thought and experience. Beals is probably
right to say that the “visibility and invisibility” of God (to use his
terms) is a dilemma for Quakers, even though I (and perhaps also
Dudiak?) would contest his claim that it is a dilemma for Levinas.
One hunch—which I confess is at this time untested—is that way
through the dilemma might be found through a rereading of, and
reflection on, the Fourth Gospel. This, the source of so many of the
key terms for Quaker thought, is a text both profoundly Jewish and
profoundly Greek, in which becoming-present of the invisible God is
narrated and reflected upon in ways that both use and break apart an
earlier theological and philosophical vocabulary. I wonder whether
(what I felt to be) the missing central ground in Beals’ article might
be found through a re-engagement with the biblical roots of some of
our Quaker vocabulary.
Taking this hunch one step further, I end by offering a modest
proposal for further work in this fruitful area. One category that
might be particularly valuable in interpreting and developing Levinas’
thought for Quaker theology is that of testimony (which is also, of
course, a Fourth Gospel term—see for example Jn. 1:7-8). Dudiak, in
his article, emphasises Levinas’ references to “bearing witness” to God’s
glory by one’s actions in response to the neighbor. In Quaker thought,
also, “testimony” is thought of primarily, or at least significantly, in
terms of action (and one’s “walk” as a way of life). To call our actions
testimony is to say that they are a way of witnessing to, responding to,
our encounters with God. Taking Levinas’ understanding of “bearing
witness” seriously may have significant implications for a Quaker
theology of testimony.
For example, as Dudiak suggests (particularly in his example of
the incident of sudden illness), the compassionate and responsible
action that “bears witness” to God is not mediated by beliefs about
God—this would in fact turn God into an idol. So Quaker testimony,
if it is anything like Levinassian “bearing witness,” is not just about
“acting out what we believe,” nor about imposing an alien religious
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or ethical ideal on recalcitrant reality. It is, rather, about being utterly
realistic about the world and the neighbour, responding to their
calls to us—and speaking of God only after being summoned to
give this practical testimony. Is it possible to say that Quakers, like
Levinas, begin with ethics, and what would this mean for how we
conceptualize “testimony”? I look forward to further conversations,
on this and related topics, with Levinas and his contemporary Quaker
interpreters.

Endnotes
1		 Thus Midrash Rabbah on Deuteronomy 21:10-23:9 (III): “R. Phinehas b. Hama said:
‘Wherever you go, pious deeds will accompany you…. If you have made for yourself a door,
the precepts accompany you, as it is said, And you will write them upon the door-posts of your
house (Deut. VI, 9); if you have put on a new garment the precepts accompany you, as it is
said, You will not wear a mingled stuff’ (ib. XXII, 11).…God said: ‘Even if you are not
engaged on any particular work but are merely journeying on the road, the precepts accompany you’.” Midrash Rabbah: Deuteronomy, Lamentations, J. Rabbinowitz trans. (London:
Socino Press, 1939), p. 123.
2		 Thus, for example, “you will come to walk cheerfully over the world, answering that of
God in everyone” (George Fox, Journal, ed. J.L. Nickalls; London: 1952; p. 263; my
emphasis).

